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Abstract: This philosophical paper explores the aesthetic argument for landscape 
conservation. The main claim is that the experience of beautiful landscapes is an essential 
part of the good human life. Beautiful landscapes make us feel at home in the world. Their 
great and irreplaceable value lies therein. To establish this claim, the concepts of landscape 
and “Stimmung” are clarified. It is shown how “Stimmung” (in the sense of mood) is 
infused into landscape (as atmosphere) and how we respond to it aesthetically. We respond 
by resonating or feeling at home. The paper ends by indicating how art can help us to 
better appreciate landscape beauty. This is done by way of an example from contemporary 
nature poetry, Michael Donhauser’s Variationen in Prosa, which begins with “Und was da 
war, es nahm uns an” (“And what was there accepted us”). 
Keywords: environmental ethics/the good life/intrinsic value/justice; environmental 
aesthetics/beauty/sublimity; landscape; “Stimmung”/mood/atmosphere; “Heimat”/feeling 
at home/sense of place; nature poetry 
 
1. Thought Experiment 
Think of your favourite places in nature, where you like to go hiking or cycling or where you just 
like to be, watching, listening, feeling, enjoying it all. Now imagine that all these places no longer 
exist, that natural beauty has become extinct. How would this affect the quality of your life? Would it 
affect it only marginally, or not at all, or fundamentally? Let me illustrate this thought experiment with 
two examples. 
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The first example is a set of pictures, Alle Jahre wieder saust der Presslufthammer nieder (in 
English, roughly: every year the jackhammer’s pounding returns) painted by Jörg Müller [1]. In 
Figure 1, you find four of the seven pictures in Müller’s series. Can you guess what these pictures 
represent? Which country? Which year? 
Figure 1. The changing countryside (© by Jörg Müller). 
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The pictures show a typical Swiss countryside and how it changed between the years 1953 and 
1972. Can you tell what season it is in the various pictures? 
In the first picture, it is obviously springtime, the fruit tree in the middle of the picture is in full 
bloom; in the second picture it is autumn, the leaves are yellow. However, what about the season in the 
last picture? It is difficult to tell, is it not? For nothing much remains of nature. The trees, meadows 
and fields are gone, the cows are gone, the brook and the pond. All that remains is the grass. The grass 
is green all year round. As it happens, it is autumn, the mini-tree planted on the roof of the discount 
store has yellow leaves. 
When I think of my own favourite places, I think of something like the first picture. In fact, the 
place where I live in Switzerland still looks a little bit like it. If you wanted to punish me, you could 
take me to the highway median strip in the last picture and abandon me there for an hour or two. I 
would hate it: this busy, noisy, stinking, ugly non-place. I would definitely not want to live in a world 
where this yellow-grey human crust has covered the entire surface of the Earth (For a scientific study 
about the changing Swiss countryside see Die ausgewechselte Landschaft [2]. The photographs on the 
back cover of this work show what Switzerland looks like in many places today: “levelled, plot 
aligned, drained, regulated, hypertrophied, devoid of species diversity, obstructed, destroyed by urban 
sprawl, illuminated, cut open, channelled, covered in artificial snow, over travelled, wired.”). 
My second example is more radical. It is the American science fiction film Soylent Green from 
1973, directed by Richard Fleischer. The film is set in New York in the year 2022. New York has 
40 million inhabitants and is suffering from overpopulation, pollution, dwindling resources, 
unemployment, poverty, dying oceans, and a hot climate due to the greenhouse effect. Much of the 
population survives on processed food rations. One of them is “soylent green”, allegedly made of 
plankton. The film is about how Detective Thorn and his aged, wise friend Solomon (Sol), who 
remembers life before the current miserable state, find out what soylent green is really made of. 
Detective Thorn searches the apartment of a murdered member of the board of the company that 
produces soylent green, and helps himself to some of the luxuries he finds there, like real bourbon, 
fresh vegetables, and a flank steak, which Sol then cooks for them. Here is a quote from their 
conversation over dinner: 
Sol: Son of a bitch. I haven’t eaten like this in years. 
Det. Thorn: I never ate like this. 
Sol: And now you know what you’ve been missing. There was a world, once, you punk. 
Det. Thorn: Yes, so you keep telling me. 
Sol: I was there. I can prove it. 
Det. Thorn: I know, I know. When you were young, people were better. 
Sol: Ah, nuts. People were always rotten. But the world was beautiful. 
What Sol and Detective Thorn find out is that “soylent green is people”—it is made of human 
remains. Unable to live with this discovery, Sol seeks assisted suicide at a government clinic called 
“Home”. The death-scene, in which Sol is hygienically dispatched with the help of piped-in light 
classical music and movies of flowering fields and breaking waves, flashed before him on a towering 
screen, is regarded as the best scene in the film. Ironically, the actor who played Sol (Edward G. 
Robinson) died of cancer 12 days after the filming. By the way, a food substitute, called “soylent”, has 
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been available for shipping in the U.S. since April 2014—to save you, as it says in the advertisement, 
the time, money and effort that usually go into preparing food. Just google “soylent”. 
Let me go back to the question I started with: How would a world devoid of landscape beauty affect 
your quality of life? Here are three possible answers: 1. not at all; 2. only marginally; and 
3. fundamentally. 
1. The loss of landscape beauty would not affect the quality of my life at all: Beautiful landscapes 
may be a luxury that is “nice to have” from time to time, but I can live a perfectly happy life 
without them. There is so much else that life has to offer: romantic love, freedom, social 
recognition, you name it. Besides, we live in a world in which millions of people are starving: 
You cannot eat natural beauty! 
This position may come in several variants: 
a. I can do without all beauty, really. 
b. I love beauty, beautiful music, painting and literature. However, landscape beauty leaves me 
cold, it does not touch me. I am a city dweller anyway, a wholehearted urbanist. 
c. I love landscape beauty, but I believe it is not that special, it can be replaced by other kinds 
of beauty. I would be just as happy reading literature instead, for example. 
2. The loss of landscape beauty would affect the quality of my life, but only marginally: I love 
beautiful landscapes and believe that they are irreplaceable. Still, you cannot have everything, 
and there are many ways to have a good life. You have to make choices. A world lacking 
natural beauty, would be an impoverished world, just like a world lacking music or painting 
would be impoverished. However, this would not prevent me from being able to have a fairly 
good life. I would simply seek other sources of fulfilment. 
3. The loss of landscape beauty would affect the quality of my life fundamentally: The experience 
of natural beauty is a necessary part of my good life. I could not live well without it. (This is 
Sol’s attitude, I guess. Sol would probably consider Thorn’s life as lacking, even though Thorn 
himself does not seem to be missing anything. Thorn even suspects that Sol is nostalgic or 
sentimental: “I know, I know. When you were young, people were better.”—Objective quality 
of life must be distinguished from subjective good or bad feelings. Missing something 
(subjective) is not the same as lacking something essential (objective). The thought experiment 
that I asked you to perform is about how the loss of landscape beauty would affect the objective 
quality of your life.). 
I could go on listing further possible answers to my question, for example: 4. my life would be 
downright bad without landscape beauty or 5. it would be miserable; or, moving to the other extreme, 
0. my life would actually be better, as I hate nature (and beauty) anyway, it disgusts me. However, I 
will stick to what I believe are the most probable answers. 
2. Main Claim 
The view I want to defend, my main claim, is a generalized version of position 3, namely, that the 
experience of landscape beauty is an essential part of the good human life. We humans cannot fare 
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well without it. The reason for this is that the experience of beautiful landscapes makes us feel at home 
in the world. Their great and irreplaceable value lies therein (This claim is stronger than the one I used 
to defend in my earlier writings on environmental ethics, see [3]). 
Why is it important to defend this view? It is important primarily for reasons of nature conservation. 
The aesthetic argument is one of the best nature conservation arguments we have. There are, to be 
sure, also other good arguments, like the basic needs argument (we need clean air to breathe) or the 
hedonistic argument (green has a soothing effect, sunlight is stimulating) (See [3] again for a critical 
taxonomy of all major anthropocentric and physiocentric nature conservation arguments). Still, the 
aesthetic argument is special, as it can substantiate our intuition that nature is more than a resource to 
be managed; it is an “other” which speaks to us, it has intrinsic value. So, we have to make the 
aesthetic argument as strong as we can. If it can be shown that landscape beauty is necessary for a 
good human life, and if moral respect and justice require that all human beings can live well, here and 
in the rest of the world, now and in the years to come (“can live well”, not “must”; nobody is to be 
forced), this would provide a powerful argument in support of the conservation of landscape beauty, 
and thus of nature. 
3. Method 
I will defend the claim about the great and irreplaceable value of landscape beauty philosophically, 
clarifying concepts, such as the concepts of landscape and “Stimmung”, and building, step by step,  
a rational argument in its favour. Clarifying concepts requires distinguishing them from neighbouring 
concepts. As Ludwig Wittgenstein famously put it: “I’ll teach you differences”. You can see  
the most important concepts and their neighbours at a glance when you look at the headings of  
the following sections. 
The philosophical method I employ does not deny that all our concepts are cultural constructions 
and that cultures and concepts change in time. The 18th-century German romantic movement, for 
example, did much to deepen our faculty to appreciate landscape beauty, but it did not invent it, or so I 
will hold. As my main claim is anthropological, I will look for concepts with a universal core. How 
these concepts have changed with time is not my topic here. 
4. The Concept of Landscape 
In order to clarify the concept of landscape I first have to say what nature is. Nature is that part of  
the world which has not been made by human beings but comes into existence, changes, and vanishes 
more or less by itself. The opposite of “nature” in this sense is “artefact”, something made by human 
beings like a table, computer, or statue. This understanding of the concept of nature can already be 
found in Aristotle. 
The amount of pristine nature or wilderness is rapidly decreasing in our modern world. Most of 
what we call “nature”, the conservation and aesthetic contemplation of which I am concerned about, 
lies in fact somewhere between the two extremes: pure nature and pure artefact. In fact, wilderness 
may often be too threatening to allow for aesthetic contemplation. A case in point is the changed 
aesthetic valence of the Alps. Its valence changed from repulsive ugliness to attractive sublimity [4]. 
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In nature, we can distinguish between individual natural organisms (like plants and animals) and 
things (like rocks) on the one hand, and larger natural units (like landscapes) on the other. Most 
landscapes today are cultivated and not untouched or wild. They are syntheses of natural and cultural 
processes [5,6]. They are not necessarily less beautiful because of that; consider, for example, the 
gardenlike English landscape. 
There is no sharp boundary between landscapes and gardens (or parks), as again England with its 
landscape gardens shows. Gardens are, first, laid out for aesthetic enjoyment; they stand between art 
and nature in this respect. Second, they typically surround a house and are themselves surrounded by 
a fence; they mediate between the house and the landscape [7]. 
To regard landscape as larger natural unit is only one understanding of it. This topographical 
understanding, for which I opt here, must be distinguished from two more restricted aesthetic ones: 
first, landscape as a larger natural unit in aesthetic contemplation, and second, as a larger natural unit 
in autonomous aesthetic contemplation (see below). All three understandings concern our everyday 
concept of landscape. I will not address more specific, scientific or academic, landscape definitions as 
they all presuppose and build upon the everyday concept. The everyday concept is the common ground 
on which we all stand if we want to have fruitful debates across disciplines (For an overview of the 
multitude of more specific landscape definitions see [8]; for views which stress the constructed 
character of landscapes see [9,10]). 
4.1. Larger Natural Unit 
In 12th-century Old High German, “lantscaf” denoted a larger natural area and its population.  
In the 15th-century Netherlands, the term could also refer to a painting of a larger natural unit; art 
historians still talk of “landscapes” in these terms. If landscapes are larger natural units, what 
constitutes their unity? As I shall suggest in the next section on “Stimmung”, it is atmosphere that 
provides this unity. Today, the boundaries of landscapes are no longer also political as they were in the 
beginning, as the German synonym “Gebiet” (“region”, from “gebieten” = to rule) makes explicit. 
4.2. Larger Natural Unit in Aesthetic Contemplation 
According to this aesthetic understanding, you encounter landscapes only when you attend to what  
is around you for its own sake. You do not experience landscapes when all you are after is recreation  
or research. 
4.3. Larger Natural Unit in Autonomous Aesthetic Contemplation 
The second, even more restricted aesthetic understanding is closely linked with Joachim Ritter’s  
well-known essay on landscape aesthetics [11] (Ritter, in fact, follows Georg Simmel [12,13]). For 
Ritter, the phenomenon of landscape begins with Petrarch’s ascent of Mont Ventoux in 1336, since 
Petrarch in this excursion and its literary reflection attended to nature as such and not only to nature as 
the book of God. This position is standard in contemporary landscape aesthetics [14–16]. 
However, it could be argued that also the contemplation of landscape that has not yet emancipated 
itself from the religious or metaphysical world-view and lacks autonomy in this sense is an aesthetic 
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contemplation, albeit not a pure but a symbolic one. After all, these pre-Enlightenment people did not 
just see letters in the book of God, but rivers, valleys and hills. Consider, for example, the “locus 
amoenus” in Plato’s Phaedrus (On the appreciation of landscape in antiquity see [17]). 
5. The Concept of “Stimmung” 
The German word “Stimmung” is untranslatable (arguably even more untranslatable than “Heimat”, 
where “being at home” or living in a “place” as opposed to a space, at least comes close). “Stimmung” 
covers three phenomena, while its English and French counterparts (“mood”, “attunement”, 
“ambience”/“ambiance”, “humeur” or “atmosphère”) usually cover only one or two [18,19]. The three 
phenomena covered by “Stimmung” are: harmony, mood, and atmosphere. 
5.1. Harmony 
Harmony or being in tune is the original meaning of “Stimmung” from the 16th-century. Musical 
instruments were said to be in tune and ready to be played, and later, in the 18th-century, the same was 
said about the faculties of the human soul. In the Critique of Judgement, Immanuel Kant famously 
talks about the harmony, “proportionierte Stimmung”, of the faculties of imagination and 
understanding in aesthetic contemplation. 
5.2. Mood 
Moods belong to the sphere of human affective experiences. In contrast to standard emotions  
(like anger, sorrow, or joy), which are about something or other in particular, moods (like being 
cheerful, satisfied, or “blue” and gloomy) have no specific objects, but rather they are about life and 
the world at large. 
Both, (specific) emotions and (general) moods, are to be distinguished from bodily feelings, which 
live in the body and are not about anything at all. Bodily feelings come in two variants, too. There are 
specific bodily feelings, like headaches, which are located in the head, and general ones, like fatigue, 
which pervade your whole body (Cf., e.g., [20]; for these well-established distinctions in 
the philosophy of the emotions). 
Moods form the basis of our psychic life; they modulate and integrate us (creating harmony, as in 
Section 5.1). Some moods come and go, others are more permanent and make up part of our character. 
Some moods are genuine, whereas others are artificial, produced by drugs. Genuine moods degenerate 
when they are no longer directed to the world but inverted, sought and enjoyed for their own sake, as 
in kitsch and sentimentality (remember how Thorn thinks that Sol is wallowing in sentimentality when 
he yearns for the good old days?) (The classic study on moods is by Otto Friedrich Bollnow [21]; 
which sadly has not been translated into English [22]; on kitsch and sentimentality see apart from 
Bollnow: [23]; and [24]). 
5.3. Atmosphere 
When landscapes, cities, or buildings are said to have atmosphere or aura they are regarded not only 
as integrated wholes (as in Section 5.1), but also as full of feeling, e.g., as full of peace or melancholy 
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(as in Section 5.2). The atmospheres of landscapes change with the weather, the time of day and 
the season. These changing atmospheres can be distinguished from the more permanent atmosphere or 
character of landscapes. The character of landscapes is constituted by their physiognomy, their 
climate, and their history. Both the character and the changing atmospheres of landscapes are objective 
phenomena, even if subjective factors like personal memories and moods also play a role in actual 
landscape experience [25–31]. 
It is landscape character that gives landscapes their unity. Landscape character is the principle of 
unity behind the topographical concept of landscape (outlined in Section 4.1). Because not all 
experience of atmospheric, larger natural units is aesthetic rather than hedonistic or scientific, the 
aesthetic concepts of landscape (in Sections 4.2 and 4.3) seem too narrow. 
What follows from this conceptual arrangement is that, when a larger natural area loses its character 
due to human destruction, it lacks the unity necessary for being a landscape. It turns into an 
expressionless heterogeneity, into a non-place or landscape garbage—as we can see in Jörg Müller’s 
last picture. It does not turn into an ugly landscape. Ugly landscapes are the opposite of aesthetically 
attractive and in this wide sense “beautiful” landscapes (When cities lose their character, they turn into 
non-places too. Cf. Alexander Mitscherlich’s influential pamphlet [32]; and Jörg Müller, in his second 
set of pictures [33]). 
To sum up, my two central claims so far are first, that landscapes are larger natural units, and 
second, that their principle of unity is character. This is the conceptual basis on which I will now try to 
reconstruct aesthetic landscape experience. 
6. How “Stimmung” is Infused into Landscape 
Phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger, Hermann Schmitz, and Gernot Böhme maintain that 
to ask how “Stimmung”, in the sense of “mood”, is infused into landscape, as atmosphere, is the wrong 
question to ask. For them, “Stimmung” is already out there. When we move in a landscape we enter its 
“Stimmung”. The phenomenon of “Stimmung” is prior to the divide between subject and world, or so 
they say. 
Yet, this understanding of “Stimmung” makes it seem like a more primitive phenomenon than it 
actually is. Adults differentiate between themselves and the world and still they experience 
“Stimmung”. So, the question remains: How is it infused into landscape? There are four main answers 
to this question. I will argue for the last one, the “expressive model”. In order to better understand it, it 
is helpful to compare it with the first three, simpler models. 
6.1. Causal Model 
According to the first answer, the fact that a landscape is peaceful means that it makes us peaceful, 
but is not really peaceful itself; to call it peaceful only projects the feeling it causes in us back onto it. 
6.2. Associative Model 
According to the second answer, the fact that a landscape is peaceful means that it makes us think of 
something peaceful, but is not really peaceful itself. 
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Both the popular causal and associative models fail to realize that the peaceful feeling is intimately 
related to the landscape. How the landscape looks, sounds, and smells is integral to a full description of 
the feeling. Contrast this with a bottle of wine that makes you cheerful and remember the good old 
days. To describe your cheerfulness you do not need to talk about how the wine tastes. 
6.3. Animistic Model 
According to the third model, the fact that a landscape is peaceful means that it is filled with spirits, 
fairies, or nymphs, which really are peaceful themselves. While small children may believe this [34], 
as adults we know that it is not the case. This leaves us with the expressive model. 
6.4. Expressive Model 
The fact that a landscape is peaceful means that it expresses peacefulness and really is peaceful 
itself, but not in the literal sense (as in the former model). Moritz Geiger, a pupil of Edmund Husserl, 
spelled out the expressive model for colours and landscapes, contrasting both the causal 
“Bewirkungstheorie” (theory of effect) and the animistic “Belebungstheorie” (theory of animation) 
with his own expressive “Gefühlscharaktertheorie” (theory of emotional character) [35]. 
The English philosopher Roger Scruton developed the expressive model in more detail for music 
and before that for architecture [36,37] (On architecture see also Nelson Goodman [38]). In music we 
can distinguish three levels: the primary and physical level of vibrations in the air; the secondary and 
phenomenal level of heard sounds—“audibila” that the deaf person cannot hear; and the tertiary and 
musical level of tones heard in the sounds. This tertiary level makes up the atmosphere of music. To 
hear tones in music moving up and down, attracting and repelling each other, striving forward and 
lingering, crying out and comforting is to hear sounds through the metaphor of human life: of human 
movement in space, of human action and feeling. A metaphor is the deliberative application of a term 
or phrase to something that is known not to exemplify it. Hearing music is metaphorical hearing. It is 
hearing with double intentionality, hearing both sounds and tones by hearing tones in sounds. 
Building on Scruton, atmospheres in landscapes can be understood as tertiary aspects like 
atmospheres in music. Landscape atmospheres are as real as their colours and sounds on the secondary 
level, which in turn are as real as the light waves and the air vibrations on the primary level. 
However, atmospheres in landscape are more primitive than atmospheres in an expressive art like 
music. Expressive art is a communication from soul to soul. It has a message. It pursues meaning.  
It articulates, explores, and meditates on human concepts in a structure all of its own. Expressiveness 
in art is an achievement. This does not hold for landscapes. Compared with art, the expressiveness of 
landscapes is a superficial phenomenon. Still, our habit of seeing expression in landscapes is 
irresistible. As Roger Scruton puts it: 
“Because we are subjects the world looks back at us with a questioning regard, and we 
respond by organizing and conceptualizing it in other ways than those endorsed by 
science. The world as we live it is not the world as science explains it, any more than the 
smile of Mona Lisa is a smear of pigments on a canvas. But this lived world is as real as the 
Mona Lisa’s smile” [39]. 
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Against imperialist tendencies in the natural sciences and their mathematically calculating dominion 
over nature—“die rechnende Weltbemeisterung”, as Theodor Litt calls it, the gazing devotion to the 
expressive richness of the world—“die schauende Hingabe”, is to be defended [40]. As Malcolm Budd 
in [41] notes, “no satisfactory account has been given of the experience of nature as the bearer of 
expressive qualities“. In Allen Carlson’s online survey on environmental aesthetics in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy [42], expressiveness is not even mentioned. In fact, Carlson’s own 
“scientific approach” [43] runs counter to it. According to his approach, we need scientific knowledge 
to appreciate nature aesthetically. But do we really need to know that a bird’s song is a territorial 
marker in order to hear it as a melody? In contrast to this, Emily Brady [44] at least stresses the role of 
imagination (as fourfold: “exploratory”, “projective”, “ampliative”, and “revelatory”). What she calls 
“projection” and “seeing as” corresponds in part to my expressive model. In recent years some 
phenomenological approaches, often following in the footsteps of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, have 
managed to enter English-speaking environmental aesthetics, see e.g., [45]. 
7. Ways of Experiencing Landscape “Stimmung” 
As a basis for understanding the specifically aesthetic way of experiencing the “Stimmung” of 
landscapes, four more basic kinds of landscape experience have to be distinguished: perception, 
empathy, sympathy, and infection. The contemporary debate on empathy, in which “empathy” can 
mean any of these different phenomena, is still in need to regain the conceptual standard that 
phenomenology had reached at the beginning of the last century, most notably in the writings of Max 
Scheler and Edith Stein. They distinguish between “Wahrnehmung” (perception), “Einfühlung” 
(empathy), “Mitgefühl” (sympathy), and “Ansteckung” (infection) [46–49]. 
7.1. Perception 
When you perceive that a landscape is peaceful, you remain affectively more or less neutral. You 
simply realize that it is peaceful (in the metaphorical sense). 
7.2. Empathy 
When you empathize with a peaceful landscape, you move with its atmosphere but you do not share 
it. Why would you not share it? Perhaps, it is because you are not in the right mood for it, but have 
agreed to make note of its character. 
As the example of cruelty makes clear, empathy occupies an intermediate position between 
perception and sympathy. Cruel people are not sympathetic to the suffering of their victims. Still, they 
need empathy to enjoy it thoroughly. 
7.3. Sympathy 
When you sympathize with a peaceful landscape you move with its atmosphere and share it. You 
resonate emotionally, like you do when you listen to a good piece of music. Sympathy is an emotion  
in the full sense, including bodily feeling, cognition, evaluation, and behaviour, while empathy is 
“only” a deeper, more vivid mode of cognitive understanding. 




When you are infected by a peaceful landscape, you are swayed by its atmosphere. 
Infection is causal, while perception, empathy, and sympathy are intentional; they are directed to the 
expressive quality of the landscape. In being directed to an “other”, they presuppose some distance 
between self and other. Infection is not alert to this distance. Infection is relevant for mental health and 
wellness, but it is itself not an aesthetic phenomenon in the non-instrumental, disinterested or 
contemplative sense of the term. 
7.5. Aesthetic Contemplation 
To experience a landscape aesthetically is not only to attend to it, to perceive it (Section 7.1) and 
empathize with it (Section 7.2) for its own sake, but also to move with it and share it (Section 7.3) for 
its own sake. 
In stressing first, the distance built into sympathy, and second, its disinterestedness, this 
understanding of aesthetic experience is obviously Kantian in a loose sense, even if Kant’s own 
aesthetics is much colder than that. The emotion of sympathy does not play any role in it. Still, with 
Kant, it is important to distinguish between the aesthetic experience itself and its physiological and 
psychological, e.g., hedonistic, impact or effect. The main thesis of my paper about how landscape 
beauty makes us feel at home in the world does not concern impact or effect. Rather, it concerns the 
quality of the aesthetic experience itself [50]. 
As social beings we enjoy sympathetic coordination. A paradigmatic case of this is dancing. Perfect 
coordination or resonance feels like unity although it is, strictly speaking, nothing but perfect 
coordination, as Martin Buber knows when he writes about the mystic in I and Thou: 
“What the ecstatic man calls union is the enrapturing dynamic of relation, not a unity 
arisen in this moment of the world’s time that dissolves the I and Thou, but the dynamic of 
relation itself, which can put itself before its bearers as they steadily confront one another, 
and cover each from the feeling of the other enraptured one. Here, then, on the brink, 
the relational act goes beyond itself; the relation itself in its vital unity is felt so forcibly 
that its parts seem to fade before it, and in the force of its life, the I and the Thou, between 
which it is established, are forgotten” [51,52]. 
Otto Friedrich Bollnow also talks about “Vereinigung” (unification) in his unpublished manuscript 
“Mensch und Natur” from the 1980s. Theodor Litt speaks of “liebende Einswerdung” (loving fusion) 
and “Amalgamierung” [53]. Josef König in contrast just calls it “Resonanz” in [50], as does, today, 
Hartmut Rosa in [54]. 
We call something “beautiful” (in the general sense) when it invites and rewards this kind of 
intrinsic sympathetic contemplation. 
8. How Beautiful Landscapes Make Us Feel at Home in the World 
Beautiful landscapes invite and reward sympathetic contemplation for its own sake. As we 
experience them synaesthetically, feeling them with all our senses, not only with our eyes and ears, 
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which are more capable of aesthetic neutrality and distance than our noses, tongues, and fingers are, 
sensual feeling and, yes, also infection is part and parcel of aesthetic landscape experience [55–58]. 
It is both the synaesthetic feeling and the sensed Buberian unity that explain why we feel immersed, 
at home, in beautiful landscapes. Beautiful landscapes are irreplaceable in that they fulfill our longing 
to be part of the natural world, the world that is just there, contingently, which comes into being, 
changes, and vanishes by itself. Beautiful landscapes heal the rift between subject and nature, both 
the nature out there and the nature in us. As Otto Friedrich Bollnow says: 
“It is disastrous when humans live in the stony deserts of cities, in rooms that more often 
than not are fully air-conditioned, and are scarcely affected anymore by the changing 
seasons. For this reason, it is extremely important that humans experience the rhythms of 
nature as well as the rhythms that order their own lives; that they feel the pauses and slow 
down for them, and then respond to the reawakening of life in the spring with all their 
energy, experiencing it as a radical renewal. But this can only occur in the intense 
experience of the sprouting green of nature. As Hölderlin writes in his lovely verses, the 
“holy green” “refreshes” us and transforms us into youths again” [59]. 
Beautiful landscapes teach us how to “dwell” on earth, Bollnow continues, following 
Martin Heidegger. They give us a sense of place and make us honour it. They invite us to put down 
roots somewhere and identify and care for it, as our special “Heimat” [60,61]. 
8.1. Three Understandings of Feeling at Home 
There are stronger and weaker forms of feeling at home in nature. So far, I have mainly focused on 
the strongest one, perfect sympathetic coordination which feels like unity. 
Often, however, we succeed only partially in our attempt at sympathetically moving with 
a landscape. Our failure need not be due to ourselves, it may also be due to the object. The classical 
distinction between the beautiful and the sublime is relevant here. For our purposes, it can be 
reconstructed as follows. Only the beautiful (now in a more limited sense than before and no longer 
synonymous with “aesthetically attractive”) allows us to be fully taken up in the object. To be sure, 
the sublime, in its infinite extent and power, entices us to sympathetically move with it, too. 
The subject enjoys participating in its magnitude and power. However, the subject also feels painfully 
reminded of her own insignificance and vulnerability. The sublime confronts us with a tension between 
a celebration of the object and self-negation. Still, insofar as the sublime appeals to us and invites us to 
partially move with it, neither leaving us cold nor threatening us existentially, we can talk about 
feeling at home (in a weaker sense) in sublime nature too [62]. Otto Friedrich Bollnow, in his 
unpublished manuscript “Mensch und Natur” [63], makes a similar point. He stresses that we should 
not confuse our being at home in nature (“Geborgenheit”) with absolute security (“Sicherheit”), as 
nature always also has aspects of the uncanny and the threatening (“zugleich immer etwas 
Unheimliches und Bedrohliches”). On Bollnow’s anthropology of dwelling, see [64]. 
A third understanding opens up when we attend to the landscape that surrounds us not as landscape 
as such, but in relation to ourselves, that is, in its functionality for our own good life. In Kantian 
terminology, the latter kind of experience is directed at the “dependent” beauty of the landscape and 
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not at its “pure” beauty (“beauty” now again in the wide sense). A landscape that looks as if it affords 
a good human life is beautiful in the functional sense. It is ugly if it does not. Thus, contrary to 
“positive aesthetics” [43,65], there is a sense, in which nature can be ugly. 
The distinction between functional and pure beauty must not be confused with the point I made 
right at the beginning (in Section 4), namely, that most landscapes today are marked by human labour. 
Even pristine nature can be functionally beautiful. Admittedly, it will be less frequently so than 
cultivated nature. It is no accident that we speak about the “garden” Eden. In functionally beautiful 
landscapes we feel at home, not only because they have a pleasant physiological and psychological 
impact on us, but also because they indicate, by the way they look, sound, and smell, that they can 
support humans and provide for their needs. Evolutionary aesthetics, which traces our idea of beauty 
back to our sense for landscapes with a high survival value for our species, like the savannah, finds its 
limited justification here [66]. 
In his Ästhetik der Natur, Martin Seel calls this functional aesthetic dimension “corresponsive”  
and contrasts it with two other aesthetic dimensions, the “contemplative” and the “imaginative”. 
His contemplative dimension concerns the pure beauty of nature, whereas his imaginative dimension 
looks at nature through the glasses of art, especially landscape painting. As Seel’s Neo-Kantian 
aesthetics is the most refined recent work on environmental aesthetics I know of, it makes sense to 
explore how my approach relates to his (Unfortunately, Seel’s book [67] has not yet been translated 
into English and the international English-speaking discussion remains unaware of it. Allen Carlson in 
his online survey does not even cite it. For an English translation of some of Seel’s core ideas, 
see [68]; for a critical review see [69]). 
8.2. Contemplation, Correspondence, and Imagination 
Seel explains these three dimensions by referring to the view across Lake Constance from his 
former office at the University of Constance. 
The first, contemplative experience of nature sees nature “as cheering space of detachment from 
active life” [70]. It perceives nature by abstracting from the importance and value of things for 
recognition and action. The I dissolves and disappears in the space of nature. This view  
of Lake Constance is free of meaning; it shows a constantly changing sensual play of  
appearances—the dancing of light reflexes, the corrugation of the waves, the fanning of  
the colours—but does not endow them with any particular significance other than what they are. 
The second, corresponsive perception of nature experiences nature “as a place that illustrates a 
successful human life” [70]. It opens up an articulated space that no longer is meaning-free, but rather 
highly meaningful, in which the synaesthetic I is enclosed. This existentially interested gaze onto Lake 
Constance sees the refreshing coolness of the lake’s surface in summer and the warming vapour of the 
mist in winter. It remains attached to certain places in memory or in feelings of anticipating joy. 
Third, the imaginative experience of nature renders nature “as a mirror of the human world full of 
images” [70]. Nature is seen as if it were an artwork freely improvising on other works and styles of art. 
The I finds that her horizon is widened as a result of this double reflection of our being-in-the-world. That 
kind of gaze onto Lake Constance perceives the way in which the lake communicates with Lorrain and 
Watteau, then with Turner and Hodler. 
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The experience of landscape that I have dealt with here is not tantamount to Seel’s “corresponsive” 
mode, as one might assume on first sight, but rather close to his “contemplative” mode. In contrast to 
Seel I believe that both, and in fact all three kinds of nature experience, can make us feel at home or 
“enclosed” in the world. Seel tends to exaggerate the differences between them anyway. What he calls 
“imaginative” is not really an aesthetic dimension in its own right, but rather an important indication 
about how much our view of nature is influenced by cultural history. Seel also goes too far when he 
denies that a landscape we experience contemplatively can have any expressive articulateness, any 
anthropomorphic expression. Seel’s formalism or autonomism of contemplation is reminiscent of 
similar movements in the aesthetics of music and architecture that pretend to be exclusively concerned 
with a meaning-free play of appearances while the language they employ to render this 
disinterestedness is permeated by expressiveness. Is not the “dancing” of light reflexes or 
the corrugation of waves on Lake Constance anthropomorphic and expressive, after all? 
Yet, what is particularly convincing is Seel’s anti-metaphysical stance. He sternly resists every 
temptation to read the corresponsive or contemplative beauty of nature as a “wink” (in Kant’s words) 
given to us by the world or by God, signalling to us that we are welcome in the world. Roger Scruton 
seems less transparent and steadfast regarding this point. Who is reassuring us, we want to ask, when 
Scruton writes about the experience of natural beauty in his book Beauty: “It contains a reassurance 
that this world is a right and fitting place to be—a home in which our human powers and prospects 
find confirmation.” [71]? My main thesis about landscape and home is not meant in a metaphysical or 
even theological manner, although aesthetic landscape experience no doubt triggers a lot of thinking 
(as Kant puts it); it triggers also metaphysical and theological aesthetic ideas. 
9. Aesthetic Education: Michael Donhauser’s Variationen in Prosa 
No artificial substitute of nature can make us feel at home in the world which is just there. This is 
the point of the death-scene in Soylent Green, in which Sol is dispatched with the help of movies of 
flowering fields and breaking waves. Still, art has a function; it may teach us, how to experience 
natural beauty in a better, fuller, keener, and deeper manner. Art presents us with icons of our 
emotions. Roger Scruton once again: 
“We encounter works of art as perfected icons of our felt potential, and appropriate them 
in order to bring form, lucidity, and self-knowledge to our inner life. The human psyche is 
transformed by art, but only because art provides us with the expressive gestures towards 
which our emotions lean in their search for sympathy—gestures which we seize, when we 
encounter them, with a sense of being carried at last to a destination that we could not 
reach alone, as when a poem offers us the words of love or grief which we cannot find in 
ourselves. Art realizes what is otherwise inchoate, unformed, and incommunicable. It does 
this because we recognize its expressive properties, and appropriate them as vehicles of 
our own emotion” [72]. 
(For more on cultivating emotions through art see [73,74].) 
Read, by way of an example, the first variation in prose “And What Was There Accepted Us” by 
the Viennese nature poet Michael Donhauser. This poem lures us through the music of its language 
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into a benign atmosphere at a lake, both on the purely sensual level and on the aesthetic level of  
non-instrumental contemplation and sympathetic coordination. Like its counterpart in nature, 
Michael Donhauser’s poem envelops us and makes us feel at home: 
“Und was da war, es nahm uns an, verloren ging, was streifte noch als Lächeln bald die 
Frage, ob, denn wo sie war, so nah verzweigt, war Früchten gleich, die reiften, fiel, was 
schön war, gross, was ungetrübt, es war ein Weg, ein Duft, und was durchs Laub als 
Luftzug fuhr, das war ein Sehen, war wie Wut, erinnert schon als Lust und schau, wie 
standen wir am See im Licht, da voll die Dolden, da der Tag uns gütig fast umfing, mit 
Armen, die wie trunken noch erblühten dann und sanken, süss und mild. 
And what was there accepted us, what was lost was what, as yet a smile, caressed the 
question presently of whether, for where that was, so close and branching out, was like a 
fruit that mellowed, fell, was lovely too, largesse, a thing unblemished, it was a way, a 
fragrance, and what ranged breeze-like through the leaves was seeing, was like fury, 
remembered now as rapture, and look, how by the lake we stood in the light, the clusters 
full, and the day all but embracing us, benign, its arms as if in drunken blossom sinking, 
sweet and soft” [75]. 
(The English translation is [76]. For more on the form of prose poetry see [77].) 
The poem begins with an upbeat note before introducing the subject of the following variations, 
the “what”. There is, however, also an abstract “we” that has left behind “the question presently of 
whether” and feels accepted, embraced, intoxicated by a gentle, full, pure and benign atmosphere at a 
lake. If it was not for the breeze that announces the evening and thus the end of the day, for the “all 
but” of being embraced, and for the “sinking” of the blossoming arms that embrace, one would have to 
call this atmosphere “paradisiacal”. The gentleness is rendered by the repeated use of the German “w” 
and the multiple use of the dark and quiet “a” right at the beginning: “Und was da war, es nahm uns 
an”. The preterite tense, rather unusual in German poetry, may have been chosen in this case to 
underscore these specific sound patterns, since “a” and “w” form the basic mood or “Stimmung” of all 
the variations. This basis supports first, the fullness and richness of the “voll die Dolden” with its 
associated sound pattern of “golden”, then, the purity, beauty and splendour in the vowel pattern  
“i–a–e” in the declamation: “Wie standen wir am See im Licht”, and finally, the force, almost violent, 
of the climactic realization: “Das war ein Sehen, war wie Wut”. The beauty that the sound evokes in 
this first variation is part of its message. 
Yet, being at home in nature does not equal being at home in paradise. Indeed, if you read on in 
Donhauser’s prose poem cycle, the summer mood declines and becomes autumnal or, more precisely, 
one of “Sommersneige”, waning summer, to take up the title of a poem by Georg Trakl—an 
atmosphere akin perhaps to Emily Dickinson’s famous renditions of the Indian summer, for example in 
“As imperceptibly as Grief/The Summer lapsed away/Too imperceptible at last/To seem  
like Perfidy”. 
This is a mixed atmosphere of beauty with a touch of sublimity, an atmosphere of sweetness with 
a touch of melancholy, an atmosphere of enjoying the fullness and ripeness of summer whilst dreading 
the coming of winter. Entering this atmosphere one rehearses, as Roger Scruton writes with regard to 
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Schubert’s music, “something that it is very hard to feel—the impulse to selfless gratitude for the gift 
of life, in full awareness that the gift will soon have vanished” [78]. 
This mixed atmosphere is being inflected throughout the cycle. Its most mature expression  
can probably be found in a variation that relates the experience of a bitter night of solitude in a room in 
which there was only a bunch of tulips that “seemed to celebrate their wilting” (“zu feiern schien das 
Welken”) [79]. The tulips provoke reflections on the fact that we—in spite of the “memento mori” and 
all the premonitions of our ultimate demise—may have led our lives too carelessly. Only those who 
abandon themselves to the plentitude and whirl of life while not neglecting destitution and death, may 
have assumed an appropriate attitude towards life, they may find themselves “uniquely presented” with 
blessings (“wie beschenkt nur ohnegleichen sich fände, was hingegeben dem Taumel schaute  
die Fülle als Not”) [79]. 
When we go along with these landscape “Stimmungen”, be it under the guidance of art or not, then 
we put ourselves into a direct relation to our creatureliness. We are gaining a grounding “Stimmung” 
that is commensurate with the basic conditions of having been born and having to die—a grounding 
“Stimmung” that carries and modulates our psychic activities in their entirety. In a purely artificial 
world, by contrast, we run the risk of losing our humanity; we are threatened by an oblivion of and 
alienation from being. We are in need of beautiful landscapes, so that we do not forget what it means 
to be part of nature as a human. This is why the experience of beautiful landscapes is a necessary 
constituent of the good human life. 
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